The Hedonic Price Function in a Matching Model of Housing Market by Lisi, Gaetano
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Hedonic Price Function in a
Matching Model of Housing Market
Gaetano Lisi
University of Cassino (Italy)
7. August 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32697/
MPRA Paper No. 32697, posted 9. August 2011 09:15 UTC
  
 
The Hedonic Price Function in a Matching Model 
of Housing Market 
Gaetano Lisi ∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a theoretical model in which the matching framework à la 
Pissarides (2000) extended to the housing market is integrated with the hedonic 
price theory. Market tightness and selling price collectively determine the long-
run equilibrium of the economic system in which a seller can become a buyer, 
and vice versa. As a result, the house price depends not only on the housing 
characteristics but also on the market tensions and bargaining power of the 
parties. This integration allows to overcome a major drawback of the hedonic 
price theory, namely the assumption of perfect competition. 
Keywords: hedonic price theory, housing market, matching models 
JEL Classification: R31, R21, J64 
 
                                                 
∗ Department of Economic Sciences and CreaM, University of Cassino, via S. Angelo, I-03043 
Cassino (FR), Italy. Email: gaetano.lisi@unicas.it, Phone: +39 0776 2994807. 
 - 1 -
1. Introduction 
The hedonic price theory, traced back to the papers of Lancaster (1966), Rosen 
(1974) and Epple (1987), is the theory of reference for the housing market.1 Due to 
the distinctive characteristics of the good taken into consideration, hedonic 
models differ from all other economic models and their formulation poses 
additional difficulties (Brown and Ethridge, 1995). The price of a composite asset 
such as a home, in fact, depends heavily on its intrinsic and extrinsic 
characteristics, whose prices (being implicit or hedonic) are not observable.  
As shown by the rigorous theoretical analysis proposed by Rosen (1974), closed-
form analytical solutions to the hedonic model are not always possible. This is 
due to the fact that the hedonic price function (which defines the budget 
constraint of households and the market value of the composite good, and from 
which the hedonic or implicit prices of each integrated characteristic are derived) 
is non linear.2 For this reason, a strictly empirical approach is required and the 
marginal implicit prices are “revealed” by estimating the coefficients of a 
multiple regression model in which the sale price is a function of the home’s 
characteristics.   
However, the use of a particular empirical model rather than another should be 
indicated by economic theory (Stock and Watson, 2003). Theoretical models are 
in fact critical in determining an accurate and consistent econometric model. 
Empirical analysis alone cannot replace conceptual reasoning when estimating 
relationships of most economic phenomena (Brown and Ethridge, 1995). 
Recently, from a theoretical point of view, there has been much focus on 
formulising the housing market through the use of search & matching models 
(Wheaton, 1990; Albrecht et al. 2007; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Genesove and Han, 
2010). It has, in fact, been acknowledged that housing markets clear not only 
through price but also through the time that a buyer and a seller spend on the 
market. Consequently, the search & matching approach is completely consistent 
even with this type of market. Furthermore, also in housing markets the price is 
substantially determined by a deal between the parties (Quan and Quigley, 1991; 
Habito et al., 2010). Indeed, a major drawback of the hedonic pricing theory is 
that bargaining has no impact on price because this theory assumes perfect 
                                                 
1 For an exhaustive overview see Sheppard (1999) and Malpezzi (2003).  
2 According to Rosen (1974), there is no reason for the hedonic price function to be linear; 
in fact, the linearity of the hedonic price function is unlikely as long as the marginal cost 
of attributes increases for sellers and it is not possible to untie packages. 
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competition (Harding et al., 2003a; Harding et al., 2003b; Cotteleer and 
Gardebroek, 2006). 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a long-run equilibrium model for the 
housing market that brings together the hedonic price theory with the matching 
framework. Basically, the two theoretical approaches pursue two different goals: 
the determination of hedonic or implicit prices (hedonic price theory) and the 
determination of the natural rate of vacancies (search and matching theory). 
In particular, we develop a decentralised long-run equilibrium model based on 
the costly search activity that characterises the housing market. In fact, sellers 
and buyers spend time and money – for advertising vacancies and making the 
effort to visit the greatest number of house – before concluding the deal. The 
proposed work takes the distinctive features of the considered market into 
account, where the formal distinction between buyer and seller becomes very 
subtle. In the model, in fact, a seller can become a buyer and vice versa. Indeed, 
most houses are bought by those who already own one, and most houses are sold 
by those wanting to buy another house (Janssen et al., 1994). Finally, the selling 
price of a house depends not only on the housing characteristics but also on the 
market tensions and bargaining power of the parties. 
This model can be used as theoretical groundwork for any empirical specification 
selected to estimate hedonic (or implicit) prices, and it allows to overcome a 
major drawback of the hedonic pricing theory: the assumption of perfect 
competition.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing 
market matching model; while section 3 concludes. 
2. The model 
2.1 The hypotheses of the model 
As we are interested in determining the sale price, the market of reference is the 
‘homeownership market’ rather than the ‘rental market’. Hence, if a contract is 
legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the 
circumstances preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual 
relationship is set up.3 
                                                 
3 In matching model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller 
match does not exist. 
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Buyers (b) expend costly search effort to find a new and better house (as in 
Wheaton (1990) there are no homeless buyers),4 while sellers (s) hold n houses 
(with n ≥ 2) of which n – 1 are on the market, i.e. vacancies (v) are simply given by 
(n – 1) · s. It is therefore possible that a buyer can become a seller and that a seller 
can re-enter the market as a buyer. The expected values of a (house) vacancy V 
and of finding a new and better house B are represented as: 5 
( ) ( ) [ ]VPyGqarV −⋅⋅+−= ,ηθ                 [1] 
( ) ( ) [ ]PBxyGgerB −−⋅⋅+−= ,ηθ                 [2] 
where θ ≡ v / b is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint,6  
while q(θ) and g(θ) are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of finding a 
vacancy and of finding a home. The properties of these functions are intuitive 
and straightforward: q’(θ)<0 and g’(θ)>0.7 Furthermore, the customary 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the matching function m=m(v,b) is 
adopted (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) . ( ) ( )1 ,0, ∈yG η  is the 
acceptance rate which depends on the housing preferences η  and income y  of 
the buyer; buyers are therefore assumed to be fully characterized by an income 
y  and parameters vector η , with distribution over possible values described by 
the joint probability ( )yG ,η . Sellers are instead characterized by their price 
bargaining power 10 ≤< γ  (see later). 
If a contract is stipulated, the buyer gets a benefit x from the property 
(abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P to the seller 
(who abandons the value of finding another buyer). Finally, a and e represent, 
respectively, the costs sustained by sellers for the advertisement of vacancies and 
the effort (in monetary terms) made by buyers to find and visit the largest 
possible number of houses. 
                                                 
4 According to Wheaton (p. 1274, 1990): «Homelessness (equivalent to unemployment) is 
relatively inconsequential in the housing market, and so moves are like voluntary “quits” in the 
labor market. Furthermore, moves involve some spell in which the household owns two units, 
whereas even voluntary job transitions usually carry some period of unemployment. More 
important, the causes of housing mobility are usually different from those generating job 
mobility». 
5 Time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the 
future at the rate r. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the 
stationary state. 
6 By definition, markets with frictions require that: 0 < θ < ∞. 
7 Standard technical assumptions are assumed, i.e. lim θ → 0 q(θ) = lim θ → ∞ g(θ) = ∞, and 
lim θ → 0 g(θ) = lim θ → ∞ q(θ) = 0. 
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2.2 Equilibrium 
The endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously at equilibrium are 
market tightness (θ) and sale price (P). 
The customary (long term) “zero profit” equilibrium condition normally used by 
matching models (Pissarides, 2000) yields the first key relationship, in which 
market tensions are a positive function of price. Using the condition V = 0 in [1], 
we obtain:  
( ) ( )θη qyGP
a
=
⋅ ,
                  [3] 
with 0/ >∂∂ Pθ  since q’(θ)<0. 
The (generalized) Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised 
markets, allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal subdivision 
of surplus ( S ) deriving from a successful match: 8 
( ) ( )
43421321
buyer ofgain   capitalseller ofgain   capital
PBxVPS −−+−=  
BxS −=⇒                    [4] 
The price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )PBxPPBxVPargmaxP −−⋅−=⇒−−⋅−= − γγγγ 1 1  
knowing that ( ) ( ) PPBx ⋅−=−−
γ
γ1
, eventually we get: 
( )BxP −⋅= γ  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )γηθ
γ
−⋅⋅+
+⋅
=⇒
1, yGgr
erxP
                            
[5] 
since g’(θ)>0, as market tensions increase, the sale price decreases; hence, we 
obtain the second key relationship of the model: 0/ <∂∂ θP . The selling price is 
a positive function of the buyer’s benefit. Indeed, the selling price can be higher 
or lower than x depending on the bargaining power of the seller. In fact,   
00 =⇒→ Pγ  
x
r
e
xP >+=⇒→1γ  
since the price can never be negative or null, 10 ≤< γ . Therefore, as usual for 
heterogeneous goods, bargaining plays a key role in the price formation process 
                                                 
8 Entering into a contractual agreement obviously implies that 0>S , i.e. Bx > , θ∀ . This 
realistic condition ensures that the price is positive. 
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(Quan and Quigley, 1991; Harding et al., 2003a; Harding et al., 2003b; Cotteleer 
and Gardebroek, 2006; Habito et al., 2010). 
It is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P tends to zero (infinity), θ 
tends to zero (infinity), as q(θ) tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of [5] and the fact that price is always positive, only one long term 
equilibrium deriving from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model 
(see point A in Figure 1 – unbroken line). 
P = P(θ, x)
θ = θ(P)
θ
P
A
B
θ *
P *
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
Finally, normalizing the population in the housing market to the unit, 1 = s + b, 
and using the definitions of equilibrium tightness ( *θθ = ) and vacancies, it is 
straightforward to obtain the share of sellers, 
*1
*
θ
θ
+−
=
n
s                   [6] 
buyers, 
*1
1
θ+−
−
=
n
nb                   [7] 
and the “natural” vacancy rate, 
( )
*1
*1
θ
θ
+−
⋅−
=
n
n
v                   [8] 
the “natural” vacancy rate is the optimal share of houses for sale on the market 
that prevails in long term equilibrium at which sellers make no economic profits 
(Arnott and Igarashi, 2000; McDonald, 2000). 
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The positive sign of θ∂∂ /s  makes clear the economic meaning of the two key 
relationships of the model: if the sale price increases, more sellers will stand in 
the market; whereas, if the market tensions increase, the effect of the well-know 
congestion externalities (see Pissarides, 2000) on the demand side will lower the 
sale price. 
2.3 The hedonic price function 
As in Habito et al. (2010), the buyer’s benefit is a positive function of housing 
characteristics c: 
x = x(c)                    [9] 
with x’(c)>0, since ceteris paribus the greater the quality/quantity of 
characteristics, the higher the buyer’s benefit. Hence, the hedonic price function 
of the model is none other than equation [5]. However, unlike the standard 
hedonic price function, the sale price of this model depends not only on the 
housing characteristics but also on the market tensions and bargaining power of 
the parties. As a consequence, the hedonic price is equal to:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 01,
'
>
−⋅⋅+
⋅⋅
=
∂
∂
γηθ
γ
yGgr
cxr
c
P
              [10] 
If c increases, the new equilibrium of the model is the point B shown in Figure 1 
(dotted line), where both the sale price and the market tensions are higher. In 
short, the housing markets are not necessarily “thin”, as suggested by Harding et 
al. (2003a) and Cotteleer and Gardebroek (2006). Nevertheless, the assumption of 
perfect competition fails because of the presence of search frictions. 
In empirical investigations of hedonic models, an interesting issue is determining 
how the market price of the commodity varies as the characteristics vary (Epple, 
1987). From [10] it is clear that the trend of P  as c  varies depends on the 
hypotheses underlying (the second derivative of) the function x(c). It follows that 
the hedonic price function of this model is compatible with any empirical 
specification. In fact, the hedonic price theory does not give precise indications 
regarding the choice of the (best) functional form to be used in empirical 
applications (Malpezzi, 2003; Taylor, 2003). 
3. Conclusions 
This paper develops a theoretical model in which the matching framework à la 
Pissarides (2010) extended to the housing market is integrated with the hedonic 
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price theory. A decentralised long-run equilibrium model is proposed, based on 
the costly search activity which characterises the housing market, where the 
formal distinction between buyer and seller becomes very subtle and the sale 
price depends not only on the characteristics of the house but also on the market 
tensions and bargaining powers of the parties. This model can be used as 
theoretical groundwork for any empirical specification selected to estimate 
hedonic (or implicit) prices, and it allows to overcome a major drawback of the 
hedonic pricing theory, namely the assumption of perfect competition. 
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